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Environmental Law 
by Travis M. Trimble* 
In 2004 courts in the Eleventh Circuit addressed several Clean Water 
Act1 issues. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals arguably expanded 
the scope of the injuries a plaintiff may allege to have standing to sue 
under the Clean Water Act. The court held that the federal court had 
jurisdiction over a Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging violations of a 
permit issued by the State of Georgia under its permitting program 
authorized under the Act.2 The Eleventh Circuit also addressed 
whether a Florida state regulation effectively revised or added to the 
state's Clean Water Act, which mandated water quality standards, 
necessitating a formal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") review 
and approval of the regulat i~n.~ In an appeal from the Eleventh 
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court held that a pump, which 
moves contaminated water from one water body to another but does not 
itself add pollutants to the water, is nevertheless a point source for 
purposes of the Act.4 Finally, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia held that the Corps of Engineers was not 
required to produce an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for the 
issuance of a Section 4045 permit for the construction of one of many 
pending reservoir projects in north G e ~ r g i a . ~  
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Former Partner in the firm of 
Anderson, Walker & Reichert, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1986); 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of 
Law (J.D., 1993). The Author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Amelia 
A. Godfrey, University of Georgia School of Law, Class of 2005. 
1. 33 U.S.C. 8 1251 (2000). 
2. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004). 
3. Fla. Pub. Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1073 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
4. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
5. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1 1344 (2000). 
6. Ga. River Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329 
(N.D. Ga. 2004). 
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In addition, the Eleventh Circuit directed the EPA to determine 
whether, under Georgia's state-implemented Clean Air Act7 permit 
program, a power company could be denied a pre-construction permit for 
a new major stationary source of air pollutants because it was a part- 
owner of an existing noncompliant major stationary source.' Finally, 
the Eleventh Circuit, under the Wilderness Actg and the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),1° addressed the National Park 
Service's use of vehicles to transport tourists on a road that runs 
through the Cumberland Island wilderness area.'' 
A. Standing 
In Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc. ,I2 the Eleventh Circuit held, 
among other things,13 that plaintiffs had standing to sue under the 
Clean Water Act14 ("CWA") when plaintiffs alleged that defendants, 
who owned and operated a scrap metal recycling business adjacent to 
plaintiffs' property, allowed contaminated storm water to migrate onto 
plaintiffs' property.15 Plaintiffs also had standing when plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants allowed contaminated storm water to migrate 
into a stream that was not on plaintiffs' property even though plaintiffs 
did not allege any harm to them resulting from that contamination.16 
The court also held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 
CWA claims despite the fact that the claims alleged violations of the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit 
conditions, which were administered by the State of Georgia under its 
7. 42 U.S.C. 5 7401 (2000). 
8. Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004). 
9. 16 U.S.C. 5 1131 (2000). 
10. 42 U.S.C. $ 4321 (2000). 
11. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). 
12. 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004). 
13. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia, asserting violations of the 
CWA and the Resource Consenration and Recovery Act ("RCRA") as  well as claims for 
contribution under the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. section 12-8-90, 
negligence, nuisance, and trespass. The jury found defendants liable under all theories and 
awarded plaintiffs $1.5 million in damages, which the court reduced to $1 million. 
Defendants appealed on numerous grounds. Parker, 386 F.3d a t  1002. 
14. 33 U.S.C. 5 1251 (2000). 
15. Parker, 386 F.3d a t  1003-04. 
16. Id. 
2005 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1257 
own permit program and had been authorized by the EPA pursuant to 
the CWA.17 
In Parker plaintiffs owned property in Covington, Georgia (the "Parker 
property"). Defendants owned and operated a metal recycling facility 
(the "SMP facility") on adjacent property that the EPA had previously 
determined was contaminated with metals, petroleum products, solvents 
and paint wastes, discarded drums containing hazardous substances, 
and discarded underground storage tanks. In 2001 plaintiffs discovered 
contamination on their property, which they reported to the Georgia 
Environmental Protection Division ("EPD"). The EPD determined that 
the SMP facility was the probable source of the contamination. Storm 
water from the SMP facility flowed across the Parker property, 
depositing contaminated dirt and sediment and causing erosion. The 
storm water also flowed into a stream located on property adjacent to 
the facility and owned by one of defendants. Defendants had neither the 
storm-water discharge permit the CWA required nor the required 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") permits. However, 
defendants did obtain the storm-water permit prior to the commence- 
ment of litigation.ls 
Before addressing the lower court's determinations, the Eleventh 
Circuit addressed two threshold issues raised by defendants on appeal: 
standing and subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the federal 
claims.lg The court first held that plaintiffs had standing under the 
CWA.20 TO have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury-in- 
fact," caused by the defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff must have 
requested relief likely to redress the injury.21 Regarding the first prong 
of the standing test, injury-in-fact, the court determined that plaintiffs 
showed "water runoff originating on the defendants' property caused 
hazardous substances . . . to migrate onto the Parker property, where 
the substances contaminated the soil and eventually made their way into 
the stream. This injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' alleged 
failure to obtain or comply with their . . . NPDES permit."22 In other 
words, the incidental injury from defendants' failure to comply with an 
NPDES permit was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the ' 
17. Id. at 1005. States are authorized to implement CWA NPDES permit programs 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2001). Id. 
18. Id. at 1001-02. 
19. Id. at 1002-05. 
20. Id. at 1003-04. The court also held plaintiffs had standing under RCRA. Id. 
21. Id. at 1003. 
22. Id. at 1003-04. 
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standing test under the CWA.23 This incidental injury was sufficient, 
even though the injury was in addition to and did not necessarily result 
from the contamination of a body of water that the NPDES permit 
requirement was intended to prevent.24 
Next, the court addressed its subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 
CWA and RCRA claims.25 Among other things, defendants contended 
that because Georgia has implemented its own programs under these 
statutes, plaintiffs' claims arose under state law and not federal law.26 
After examining the relevant language in the CWA and United States 
Supreme Court precedent, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "a plain 
reading of this statute indicates that state permits and conditions fall 
23. Id. 
24. Id. The dissent contended that plaintiffs lacked standing under the CWA because 
plaintiffs did not allege any harm resulted from the stream's pollution. Id. a t  1021 
(Forrester, J., dissenting). The majority never directly addressed this point, stating that 
for standing, plaintiffs may show only that "the value of their property was diminished, a t  
least in part due to the pollution from the polluting facility." Id. a t  1004 n.11. The 
majority and dissent both cited Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), in support of their positions. The majority claimed that 
Laidlaw "belies the dissent's conclusion" because in that case 
Gail Lee [one of the members of the plaintiff group] "attested that her home, 
which is near Laidlaw's facility, had a lower value than similar homes located 
farther from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges accounted 
for some of the discrepancy." There is no suggestion in the Supreme Court's 
opinion that Lee alleged an aesthetic or recreational injury, or that Lee was a 
riparian owner, but the Supreme Court held that her sworn statement adequately 
demonstrated an injury-in-fact. 
Parker, 386 F.3d a t  1004 n. 11 (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. a t  182-83). 
The court's characterization of Laidlaw in  Parker is slightly misleading. The quoted 
language from Laidlaw recounted the testimony of Lee, who was one of numerous members 
of the plaintiff group whose testimony the Supreme Court summarized. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 
a t  183. All of the members, but Lee, alleged that they actually used the waterway a t  issue 
or would use it  but for the ~ollution. Id. The United States S u ~ r e m e  Court summarized 
their testimony for the proposition that "environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury 
in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the . 
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity."' 
Id. (citation omitted). Although Lee appeared to allege an economic injury, which is also 
sufficient for CWA standing, rather than an aesthetic or recreational one, the clear 
implication in Laidlaw is that plaintiffs, including Lee, alleged injuries that directly 
resulted from the water in issue's lessened quality, which was due to defendant's pollution 
and not merely injuries caused by defendant's pollution, when the pollution also happened 
to contaminate a navigable water in violation of the CWA. Id. a t  183-84. 
25. Parker, 386 F.3d a t  1004-06. Because the rest of plaintiffs' claims were state law 
claims, the court's jurisdiction over the entire case depended on it having jurisdiction over 
a t  least one of the federal claims. See id. a t  1005 11.12. See also 28 U.S.C. 8 1367 (2005). 
26. Parker, 386 F.3d a t  1005. The CWA authorizes states to implement their own 
NPDES permit programs after receiving EPA approval. Id. 
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within the effluent standards of conditions covered [by the CWAl"27 and 
that "the Supreme Court apparently has incorporated state law 
standards under the CWA into federal environmental law for jurisdic- 
tional purposes."28 
Regarding its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' RCRA claim, the court noted 
that an EPA-approved state implementation program under RCRA, 
unlike the CWA, operates "'in lieu of the federal program."'29 The court 
declined to determine if the "RCRA grants federal courts j ~ s d i c t i o n  
over citizen suits alleging a violation of an EPA-approved state law 
under the RCRA."30 The court ultimately did not decide the RCRA 
jurisdiction question, concluding that, because it had jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' CWA claims, it had supplemental jurisdiction over the RCRA 
claim.31 
The court determined there was sufficient evidence on the merits to 
support the jury's determination that defendants were liable under the 
state law theories for the CWA and RCRA claims.32 However, the court 
remanded the case for a new trial on damages because the district court 
failed to instruct the jury that plaintiffs, who were not owners of the 
Parker Property prior to filing the complaint, could not recover 
damages.33 
B. Water Quality Standards 
In Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,34 the Eleventh Circuit remanded the 
case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida to determine whether a Florida administrative rule35 actually 
changed or added to the CWA water quality standards, which would 
have required a full review of the new regulation by the EPA.36 The 
Florida administrative rule was adopted ostensibly to provide criteria for 
the state to use in evaluating if state waters should be designated as 
27. Id. at 1005-06. 
28. Id. at 1006. 
29. Id. at 1006 11.13. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1008. 
32. Id. at 1015. 
33. Id. at 1018-19. Only one of the plaintiffs, Quebell Parker, had an ownership 
interest in the property during the events at issue in the case. After the institution of the 
lawsuit, Mrs. Parker created a joint tenancy in the property with the other two plaintiffs, 
her daughter and son. Id. at 1000 n.2. 
34. 386 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter FPIRG]. 
35. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62-302.200 to 300 (1997). 
36. 386 F.3d at 1073. 1089. 
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"impaired" under Florida's separate water quality standards, which were 
adopted pursuant to the CWA.37 The court held that plaintiffs, Florida 
Public Interest Research Group ("PIRG") and other groups, had standing 
and had presented a claim that was not moot.38 
The substantive issue the case presented was whether the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP) modified the state's 
existing water quality standards by establishing a new rule.39 The 
CWA requires each state to establish water quality standards'for all its 
bodies of water.40 The standards must designate permissible use or 
uses of the water body and must also set basic criteria for the level of 
water quality necessary to allow the water body's designated use or uses 
safely. Each state may express the criteria numerically or narrative- 
ly.41 While the state initially establishes its own water quality 
standards, the EPA must undertake a review of any new or revised 
water quality standards adopted by the state.42 Any new or revised 
state rule cannot allow further degradation of a water body's quality.43 
The state must also maintain a list of waters it deems unsafe for its 
intended uses, known as the "Impaired Waters List." Once the state 
determines a water is impaired, both the state and federal governments 
must take action to control and remedy the pollution.44 
Florida's water quality standards regulations, which set the maximum 
levels of pollutants that each water body can contain without becoming 
unsafe for use, state, among other things, that "[ulnless otherwise 
stated, all criteria express the maximum not be exceeded at any time."45 
The rules also provide that "[iln no case shall nutrient concentrations of 
a body of water be altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural 
populations of aquatic flora or fauna."46 
In April 2001 FDEP adopted an "Impaired Waters Rule," the stated 
purpose of which was to "'interpret existing water quality criteria and 
evaluate attainment of established designated use."'47 The rule further 
provided that its purpose was "not . . . to establish new water quality 
37. Id. at 1074. 
38. Id. at 1085, 1088. 
39. Id. at 1073. 
40. 40 C.F.R. 5 131.2 (2004). 
41. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073. 
42. Id. See also 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(c)(2)(a) (2000). When the EPA undertakes such a 
review, the lvle defines the issues it is required to consider. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073. 
43. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073. 
44. Id. at 1074. 
45. Id. at 1075 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62-302.530). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (citation omitted). 
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criteria or  standard^."^' The EPA provided the FDEP guidance in 
drafting the Impaired Waters Rule, but the EPA did not conduct the 
official review, which the CWA would require for any new or revised 
water quality ~tandard.~ '  
Plaintiffs sued under the CWA's citizen suit provision to force the EPA 
to conduct the review required of new or revised water quality stan- 
dards. Plaintiffs contended that the Impaired Waters Rule effectively 
created new or revised water quality standards by first requiring more 
than a single sample from a water body to exceed a maximum concentra- 
tion level of a pollutant before the water body would be deemed impaired 
(contradicting the standard that no maximum limit would be exceeded 
at any time); and second, by adopting specific nutrient concentrations to 
assess nutrient impairment, which do not exist in the water quality 
standards. Plaintiffs claimed that the water quality standards instead 
prohibited any nutrient imbalance from affecting natural populations of 
plant or animal life. Additionally, plaintiffs contended that the effect of 
the Impaired Waters Rule was a "more forgiving, looser water quality 
~tandard,"~' which, as a practical matter, resulted in the state remov- 
ing over two hundred waters from the Impaired Waters List.51 The 
court noted that waters removed from the list were "no longer subject to 
procedures used to clean up impaired waters."52 Even though the EPA 
reviewed the state's de-listing decisions individually and re-listed some 
waters, it did not formally review the rule or require Florida to change 
either the rule itself or its application of the rule in future updates to 
the Impaired Waters List.53 
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judg- 
ment.54 As described by the Eleventh Circuit, the district court first 
reasoned that to amend the water quality standards, FDEP had to follow 
the rule-making procedure in Florida's Administrative Procedure 
Because FDEP did not do so, no amendment occurred.56 Second, the 
court reasoned that an amendment to the standards required formal 
48. Id. 
49. Id. a t  1076-77. 
50. Id. a t  1075. 
51. Id. 1080 n.14. The parties disputed the exact number of water bodies de-listed by 
the FDEP's application of the Impaired Waters Rule. Because the EPA reviewed the de- 
listings individually and re-listed some the court found that a t  least over one hundred 
water bodies had been removed from the list and not replaced by the EPA. Id. 
52. Id. a t  1080. 
53. Id. a t  1079-80, 1080 n.13. 
54. Id. a t  1080. 
55. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.54 (2002). 
56. FPIRG, 386 F.3d a t  1081. 
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EPA approval.57 Because the EPA did not obtain that approval, no 
amendment occurred.58 Finally, the court reasoned that because the 
terms of the Impaired Waters Rule stated that its purpose was not to 
establish new water quality criteria or standards, none could have 
legally been e~tablished.~' 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court and remanded 
the case, holding that the district court was "required to conduct an 
independent inquiry into the actual effect of the Impaired Waters Rule" 
to determine whether the rule "has the [practical] effect of loosening 
Florida's water quality standards."" The court stated, 
if waterbodies that under pre-existing testing methodologies would 
have been included on the [impaired waters] list were left off the list 
because of the Impaired Waters Rule, then in effect the Rule would 
have created new or revised water quality standards, even if the 
language of the regulation said otherwise. This is the crux of the 
matter.61 
If the district court were to find that the rule did create new or revised 
standards, then the EPA would have a non-discretionary duty to review 
the rule according to criteria set out in the EPA's own rules and its anti- 
degradation 
C.  NPDES Permit-Point Source 
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Dibe of 
I n d i a n ~ , ~ ~  the United States Supreme Court held that a pump that did 
not itself generate pollutants but merely conveyed pollutant-containing 
water into a navigable water was a point source under the CWA. The 
Court further held that the pump's operation required a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.64 The 
Court also discussed, but did not decide, an issue with potentially far- 
reaching effects on governmental water management projects: The 
"unitary waters" approach to defining "navigable waters" under the 
CWA.65 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1089-90. 
61. Id. at 1090. 
62. See id. at 1088. 
63. 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
64. Id. at 105. 
65. Id. at 105-06. 
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The South Florida Water Management District (the "District") 
manages a system of canals, pumps, and levees constructed in the early 
1900s by the Corps of Engineers to control flooding in south Florida. 
Prior to the system's construction, rain water in the area at issue 
drained south and east and joined groundwater to form a single large 
wetland. The system artificially separated the drainage into western 
and eastern sides, keeping the eastern side relatively dry and habitable. 
Presently, rain water that falls on the populated eastern side of the levee 
is collected in a canal and pumped over the levee into a wetland on the 
undeveloped western side, which is part of the Everglades ecosystem.66 
Describing the process, the Court stated, "[tlhe combined effect of [the 
levees and canal] is artificially to separate the [canal] basin from [the 
wetland]; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland covered 
in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water flowing slowly 
southward."" However, rain water that falls on the eastern side of the 
drainage also absorbs contaminants, primarily phosphorus from 
fertilizers, which are then trapped in the canal and eventually pumped 
into the wetland on the western side.68 
The Miccosukee Tribe ("the Tribe") and another organization filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
to enjoin the District's operation of the pump that conveys the phospho- 
rus-containing water from the canal on the eastern side of the levee to 
the wetland on the western side of the levee. Plaintiffs argued that the 
pump was a point source that discharged pollutants into "navigable 
waters," as defined in the CWA, for which the District did not have an 
NPDES permit. The district court granted summary judgment to the 
Tribe, ruling that the District was required to obtain an NPDES permit 
for the pump. The Eleventh Circuit affir~ned.~' 
In its appeal, the District and the federal government as amicus made 
three separate arguments that the pump did not require an NPDES 
permit. First, the District's pumping of water from the canal to the 
wetland did not constitute an addition of pollutants from a point source 
within the meaning of the CWA because no pollutant originated from the 
pumping process.70 Second, the CWA did not require a permit for the . 
66. Id. a t  98-100. 
67. Id. a t  101. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. a t  103. The Eleventh Circuit decision is reported a t  280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
70. Id. a t  104-05. The CWA prohibits "any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source" except in compliance with an NPDES permit, which places 
limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that may be discharged. Id. a t  102. A "point 
source" is in turn defined as  "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance from which 
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conveyance of unaltered water from one body of navigable water to 
another (the "unitary waters" argument).71 Finally, the canal on the 
eastern side of the levees and the wetland on the west were actually two 
parts of a single, interconnected body of water, and thus, the act of 
pumping water from one to the other simply moved water around within 
the same water body rather than adding anything to a separate water 
body.72 
As to the first issue, the Court held that the pump could be considered 
a point source that discharged pollutants to navigable waters and thus 
could require an NPDES permit.73 The Court noted that a point 
source, by definition, is any "discernible, confined and discrete conuey- 
a n ~ e " ~ ~  and stated "[tlhat definition makes plain that a point source 
need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the 
pollutant to 'navigable waters' . . . ."75 
The Court discussed the second issue at greater length but did not 
decide it.76 In its "unitary waters" theory, the Government as amicus 
argued that because the CWA definition of the discharge of a pollut- 
ant77 does not contain the word "any" before "navigable waters," 
Congress did not intend to regulate the transfer of one "navigable water" 
into another. Instead, the Court concluded that Congress intended to 
regulate only the introduction of pollutants from a source other than a 
navigable water into navigable water.78 
The Court raised several potential problems with the "unitary waters" 
theory of defining navigable waters.79 The Court noted that other parts 
of the CWA suggest that "the Act protects individual water bodies as 
well as the 'waters of the United States' as a whole" and that the 
approach "could also conflict with current NPDES  regulation^."'^ The 
pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. Q 1311 (2000) and 33 U.S.C. 
Q 1362 (2000)). 
71. Id. at 103-06. There was no dispute that the canal and the wetland were both 
navigable waters within the CWA's definition. Id. at 102. 
72. Id. at 108. 
73. Id. at 105. 
74. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. Q 1362(14) (2000)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 109. 
77. Id. at 105. The CWA definition of the discharge of a pollutant is "any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable water from any point source." Id. at 105-06. 
78. Id. at 106. The Government's and other amici's primary concern with the Eleventh 
Circuit's holding appeared to be the regulatoly burden it could place on public water supply 
networks, particularly in the west, that rely on water supply and flood control from the 
engineered transfer of water among various bodies of water. Id. at 108. 
79. Id. at 105-06. 
80. Id. at 107. 
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Court acknowledged that if it were to adopt the "unitary waters" 
approach, the District could operate its pump without an NPDES 
permit.81 However, the Court ultimately declined to resolve the 
"unitary waters" issue because petitioners did not raise the argument 
before the Eleventh Circuit or in their petition for certiorari, and because 
the Court would vacate the grant of summary judgment to the Tribe and 
remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit based on the third issue raised 
by petitioners.82 The Court noted that the issue would be available to 
petitioners on remand.83 
The Court remanded the case on the third issue raised by petitioners, 
which petitioners had also raised below: The canal and the wetland 
were actually one hydrologically connected body of water, and thus, no 
NPDES permit was required to move water around in it.84 The Court 
acknowledged there was significant evidence in the record that the two 
bodies of water were in fact one.85 Most notably, the record reflected 
the possibility that if the pump was shut down, the canal would quickly 
flood and possibly join the wetland to form one body of water, which in 
turn "might call into question the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that [the 
pump] is the cause in fact of phosphorus addition to [the 
The Court noted that the district court found that the canal and wetland 
were separate without considering this evidence, and therefore, the 
Court remanded the case for further development of the record.87 
D. Section 404-NEPA Environmental Impact Statement 
In Georgia River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of  engineer^,'^ the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held 
that the Corps of Engineers ("Corps") was not required to issue an 
Environmental Impact Statement C'EIS") prior to issuing a CWA section 
404 permit89 to defendant Henry County Water and Sewerage Authori- 
ty ("HCA) to deposit fill material into Tussahaw Creek to construct a 
81. Id. at 106. 
82. Id. at 109. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 111-12. The parties did not dispute that if the canal and wetland were found 
to be two parts of the same water body, pumping water from one side to the other would 
not constitute the addition of pollutants and thus would not require an NPDES permit. 
Id. 
85. Id. at 110. 
86. Id. at 111. 
87. Id. at 111-12. 
88. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
89. Section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1344 (2001), requires a party seeking to place 
dredge or fill material into waters of the United States to obtain a permit from the Corps. 
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dam and reservoir. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' motions to 
enjoin the Corps from issuing the permit.g0 
In 2000 HCA applied for a section 404 permit to construct a reservoir 
on Tussahaw Creek in the Upper Ocmulgee River Basin to meet the 
water needs of its booming population. At the time the court issued its 
opinion, HCA's reservoir was one of forty-three reservoirs planned in 
Georgia, many in the north due to the population growth in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area. Furthermore, no comprehensive statei+ide plan 
existed to manage water resources, resulting in what the Corps 
described as a "race for permits" and the issuance of permits on a first- 
come, first-served basis for north Georgia counties seeking  reservoir^.^^ 
During the comment phase of the HCA's permit process, both the EPA 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended that the Corps 
deny the permit, citing the need for a comprehensive assessment of the 
impact of pending reservoir permits in north Georgia." However, after 
conducting an Environmental Assessment ('%Ap), the Corps determined 
that HCA's reservoir did not pose a significant impact to the environ- 
mentg3 and issued to HCA a 404 permit with mitigation  condition^.^^ 
Using the Eleventh Circuit's four-part test to determine whether an 
agency decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary or capricious,95 the 
court reviewed the record before the Corps regarding direct, cumulative, 
and indirect impacts of the reservoir on wetlands, aquatic and wildlife 
habitat, and water quality and quantity. The court found in each case 
that the Corps had properly concluded either that the reservoir had no 
significant impact, or that the mitigation HCA was required to perform 
as part of the 404 permit would reduce the cumulative impact to a 
minimum on wetlands and streams.96 
The court also determined that the Corps did not need to perform a 
comprehensive EIS, examining the impact of all pending reservoir 
90. Georgia River Network, 334 F. Supp. 2d a t  1332. 
91. Id. a t  1332-33. 
92. Id. a t  1333. 
93. "Finding of No Significant Impact," or FONSI. NEPA and its relevant regulations 
require a n  agency to assess the environmental impact of a proposed agency action to 
determine whether it  will have a significant impact on the environment. If so, the agency 
must perform an EIS. If not, the agency issues a FONSI. Id. a t  1335. 
94. Id. a t  1333. 
95. Under Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1998), the agency must have accurately 
identified the relevant environmental concern; it  must have taken a "hard look a t  each 
concern when preparing an EA; it  must make a convincing case for a FONSI; and if the 
agency finds a significant impact, i t  can still avoid preparing an EIS if i t  finds that changes 
or safeguards i n  the project reduce the impact to a minimum. Georgia River Network, 334 
F.  Supp. 2d a t  1335. 
96. Id. a t  1341-42. 
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decisions in north Ge~rgia. '~ The court noted that a comprehensive 
EIS was sometimes warranted when the agency's projects were either 
regional or systemic in scope, or when a project was "one of a series of 
interrelated proposals that will produce cumulative systemwide effects 
that can be meaningfully evaluated t~gether."~' The court, however, 
determined that the Corps limited its review of the project's scope to the 
Ocmulgee basin, and plaintiffs did not challenge the scope. Thus, the 
reservoirs were not part of a regional plan or pr~grarn.~'  Nothing in 
the record showed that the forty-two proposed reservoirs had a 
significant cumulative impact on a discrete area, thus eliminating the 
need for a comprehensive EIS.loO 
11. CLEAN AIR ACT 
In Sierra Club v. Leavitt,lol the Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in upholding a state agency's issuance 
of a preconstruction permit for a major stationary source of air 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act (''CAA").102 In doing so the EPA 
failed to explain why the permit applicant, who was part owner of 
another non-compliant major stationary source, was entitled to have only 
the parts of the non-compliant source it actually owned considered for 
the purposes of its compliance with the requirements of the rule 
governing the issuance of preconstruction permits.lo3 
In Sierra Club respondent Oglethorpe Power Corporation ("Ogle- 
thorpe") applied to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division 
("EPD") in 2000 for preconstruction and Title V operating permits for 
Block 8, an unbuilt "power block it had acquired from Georgia Power 
Company. Block 8 was located at part of Plant Wansley, a coal-fired 
97. Id. a t  1343. 
98. Id. a t  1342 (citing Isaak Walton Legal of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 374 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)). 
99. Id. a t  1343. The construction of a large number of reservoirs in north Georgia in . 
the absence of a comprehensive water use plan, which perhaps would take into account the 
environmental impacts over a large region, was no doubt one of the problems plaintiffs 
sought to address by attempting to obtain a comprehensive EIS from the Corps. The court 
recognized as  much when it  stated that "[nlo reasonable person can disagree with Plaintiffs 
that some comprehensive consideration of the use of water resources in north Georgia 
should be considered. Plaintiffs, however, may have chosen the wrong reservoir in the 
wrong place to use NEPA as the tool to accomplish this goal." Id. The court indicated that 
this issue was better addressed by the state. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004). 
102. 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2000); Sierra Club, 368 F.3d a t  1309. 
103. Id. 
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power plant in Heard County, Georgia.lo4 When it applied for the 
permits, Oglethorpe was the owner of two of the four power-generating 
units a t  Plant Scherer, which is also in Georgia. The other two 
generating units at  Scherer were owned by Georgia Power, and Plant 
Scherer was out of compliance with its Title V operating permit due to 
emissions from Georgia Power's units. Oglethorpe's units a t  Scherer 
were not out of compliance.lo5 
Georgia's State Implementation Plan, adopted to implement: the CAA, 
requires a so-called "preconstruction permit" for the construction of a 
new or modified "major stationary source," which the CAA defines as 
"any stationary source (or any group of stationary sources located within 
a contiguous area and under common control)" that emit in excess of a 
defined amount of air  pollutant^.'^^ The relevant Georgia administra- 
tive rule (the "Georgia Rule") governing the issuance of preconstruction 
permits provides that 
[Nlo permit to construct a new or modified major stationary source . . . 
shall be issued unless . . . (3) [tlhe owner or operator of the proposed 
new or modified source has demonstrated that all major stationary 
sources owned or operated by such person (or by an  entity controlling, 
controlled by, or under common control with such person) in this State, 
are subject to emission limitations and are in compliance, or on a 
schedule for compliance, with all applicable emission limitations and 
standards under the Act.lo7 
Petitioner Sierra Club challenged Oglethorpe's permit application before 
the EPD, which issued the permit in 2002. Sierra Club petitioned the 
EPA to object to the issuance but the EPA declined. Sierra Club then 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.loS 
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether, under the Georgia 
Rule, Oglethorpe should have been issued preconstruction and Title V 
operating permits for its new unit at  Plant Wansley when it was an 
owner of two constituent units comprising Plant Scherer, which in turn 
was out of compliance with its Title V permit because of two other plant 
units that Georgia Power owned, not O g l e t h ~ r p e . ~ ~ ~  The court noted 
, 
that the Georgia Rule was ambiguous in this situation, for example, 
104. Id. at 1303. 
105. Id. at 1305. 
106. Id. at 1302 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 8 7661 (2003)). 
107. Id. at 1305 (quoting GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 391-3-1-.03(8)(c)(3)). 
108. Id. at 1301. 
109. Id. at 1304, 1306-07. The court assumed arguendo that because two of its four 
units were out of compliance, Plant Scherer, as a major stationary source under Title V, 
was out of compliance. See id. at 1306 n.lO. 
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when the permit applicant "owns part of a noncompliant major 
stationary source."'10 The court went on to note that when a regula- 
tion is ambiguous, the court follows Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.'" and defers to the agency's interpre- 
tation of the regulation.'l2 However, here the court concluded that 
deference was not appropriate because the EPA "failed entirely to 
address or explain part of the problem it faced."l13 The court noted 
that the EPA had presumed, without explanation, that when the 
applicant co-owned a non-compliant major stationary source, the Georgia 
Rule allowed the agency to consider the compliance status of only that 
portion of the source owned by the entity applying for the 
The court interpreted the EPA's finding in an implicit determination 
that "the Georgia Rule allows breaking major stationary sources into 
constituent parts with compliance determined individually."l15 
The court determined that in so doing, the EPA treated the two 
appearances of the term "major stationary source" in the Georgia Rule 
as having different meanings.l16 In other words, for the purpose of 
determining that Oglethorpe needed a preconstruction permit for its unit 
a t  Plant Wansley, the agencies determined that the unit was part of a 
single major stationary source because it was on contiguous property and 
under common control.'17 However, when considering whether all the 
major stationary sources that Oglethorpe owned or controlled were in 
compliance under the CAA, the agencies considered the units it owned 
a t  Plant Scherer separately from those Georgia Power owned. The court 
stated that in the EPA's order upholding the permit issuance, 
the EPA failed even to note that  i t  ha[d] defined the same term, major 
stationary source, in two different ways, and i t  failed to acknowledge, 
much less explain or justify, the implicit policy decision driving the 
creation of the two definitions-that for the purposes of the Georgia 
110. Id. at 1304 (emphasis added). 
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
112. Sierra Club, 368 F.3d at 1304. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1305-06. Both EPA and EPD adopted the term "facilities" to describe and 
focus on only those power generating units owned by Oglethorpe, rather than "major 
stationary source," which is the term required by the rule. Id. at 1305. Thus, the agencies 
were able to conclude that "all of Oglethorpe Power's facilities in Georgia are in compliance 
with all applicable requirements." Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1304. 
117. Id. at 1303 n.6. 
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Rule, "major stationary sources" may be broken into separate parts 
with compliance determined individually.11s 
The court noted that the rules of statutory interpretation require a 
consistent interpretation for a term appearing twice in statutory 
language and that while "[tlhese principles of statutory interpretation 
are not absolute, [the] EPA should offer something more before 
abandoning them."llg 
For these reasons, the court held that the EPA's decision ipholding 
EPD's permit issuance was arbitrary and capricious.120 The court 
refused to address the EPA's post-hoc justifications for interpreting the 
term differently within the same rule because the explanation was a 
"litigation position" in its brief and the agency itself did not articulate 
or explain its justification based on information it had during its 
decision-making process.121 The court vacated the order upholding 
Oglethorpe's permit and remanded the case to the agency for further 
consideration. 122 
111. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PO ICY ACTIWILDERNESS ACT 
In Wilderness Watch v. Mainella,123 the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the National Park Service ("Park Service") violated the Wilderness 
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1769 ("NE- 
PA")lZ5 when it began transporting visitors in motor vehicles through 
Cumberland Island's designated wilderness area to visit historic sites on 
the north end of the i~1and . l~~  
Cumberland Island, on the Georgia coast, was declared a National 
Seashore in 1972. In 1982 Congress designated 19,000 acres of the 
island to either wilderness or potential wilderness, including much of the 
northern end of the island. Park Service land on the island also includes 
two historic sites on the north end: Plum Orchard and the Settlement. 
118. Id. a t  1306. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. a t  1303. 
121. Id. a t  1307. 
122. Id. a t  1309. 
123. 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 
124. 16 U.S.C. 9 1131 (2000). 
125. 42 U.S.C. $4321 (2000). 
126. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d a t  1096. The portion of the court's holding regarding 
the Wilderness Act has apparently been rendered moot by the passage of Public Law No. 
108-447 (2004), the omnibus spending bill signed into law on December 8, 2004. This law 
contains provisions by Representative Jack Kingston of Georgia that redraw the wilderness 
area on Cumberland Island to exclude the road a t  issue in this case. 
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Vehicle access to these sites is by a one-lane dirt road that runs through 
the wilderness area.127 
The Park Service has traditionally used the road to access the sites for 
maintenance purposes as needed. In 1999 the Park Service began 
providing vehicle transportation to the sites for island visitors, first in 
four-person vehicles then in a fifteen-passenger van on a regular 
schedule. After litigation commenced in 2002, the Park Service began 
transporting visitors to Plum Orchard by boat and discontinued van 
service there, but continued to use the van and the road to take visitors 
to the Settlement.lZ8 
Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin transportation of visitors by vehicle across 
the wilderness area, contending that the practice violated the Wilderness 
Act's restriction on the use of motor vehicles in a wilderness area.12' 
Plaintiffs further argued that under NEPA, the Park Service should 
have conducted a review of the practice's potential environmental 
impacts before it began.l3' 
The Park Service contended that its transportation of visitors to the 
historic sites was permissible under the Act because (1) the Park Service 
required vehicle access to meet its separate obligation to maintain the 
historic structures in the wilderness area, which is part of its duty to 
"further the purposes of the Wilderness Act," and (2) under the Act, 
designated wilderness may be used for "public purposes."131 Regarding 
the NEPA claim, the Park Service admitted that it did not perform an 
environmental impact review, but argued that its activities relating to 
the sites' maintenance were exempt from NEPA  requirement^.'^^ 
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
the Park Service.133 Regarding plaintiffs' Wilderness Act claim, the 
127. Id. a t  1088-89. 
128. Id. a t  1084, 1090 n.6. 
129. The Wilderness Act prohibits the use of motor vehicles in a wilderness area 
"except as  necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area." 
16 U.S.C. 5 1133(c) (2000). 
130. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d a t  1087. Under the NEPA, federal agencies must 
document "the potential environmental impacts of significant decisions before they are 
made, thereby insuring that environmental issues are considered by the agency and that 
important information is made available to the larger audience that may help to make the 
decision or will be affected by it." Id. a t  1094. 
131. Id. a t  1090. 
132. Id. a t  1094. The Park Service cited a regulation of the Council on Environmental 
Quality that excluded from the NEPA erbironmental impact review requirement any 
"routine and continuing government business, including . . . administration [and] 
maintenance . . . activities having limited context and intensity; e.g., limited size and 
magnitude or short-term effects." Id. 
133. Id. a t  1087-88, 1096. 
1272 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
court first noted that the Park Service's obligation to maintain the 
historic structures came from the National Historic Preservation 
and not from the Wilderness The court determined 
that the purpose of the Wilderness Act was the maintenance of a 
designated area in its natural In any event, the court con- 
cluded that "[tlhe Park Service's decision to 'administer' the Settlement 
using a fifteen-passenger van filled with tourists simply cannot be 
construed as 'necessary' to meet the 'minimum requirements' for 
administering the area 'for the purpose of the [Wilderness 
The court hrther held that the language of the specific Wilderness Act 
provision at issue and the Wilderness Act's overall purpose and structure 
demonstrated that "Congress has unambiguously prohibited the Park 
Service from offering motorized transportation to park visitors through 
the wilderness area."138 
The court also concluded that the Park Service violated the NEPA.13' 
The court held that for the Park Service to rely on the regulatory 
exclusion from NEPA requirements for routine government business, it 
would have had to show it considered whether the exclusion applied to 
the proposed activity in question before undertaking the activity, which 
the Park Service did not do.140 However, the court rejected the 
argument that the categorical exclusion for 'routine and continuing 
government business' included the agency action.l4' The court conclud- 
ed that "obtaining a large van to accommodate fifteen tourists hardly 
appears to be a 'routine and continuing' form of administration and 
maintenance."142 
134. 16 U.S.C. 5 470 et. seq. (2000). 
135. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d a t  1091. 
136. Id. a t  1092. 
137. Id. a t  1092. 
138. Id. a t  1094. 
139. Id. a t  1095. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. a t  1094. 
142. Id. a t  1095. The court's holding regarding the NEPA issue does not specifically 
state that the Park Service should have performed an environmental impact review. Id. 
The holding appears to be that the Park Service violated NEPA by failing to determine, 
prior to making the decision to transport visitors through the wilderness area, whether the 
exclusion for "routine and continuing government business," including relevant exceptions 
to the exclusion, applied to this activity. Id. The court's NEPA holding may be more 
significant after the legislative revision to the wilderness area designation on Cumberland, 
which apparently renders moot the court's holding that the Wilderness Act prohibited the 
transportation of passengers in vehicles through the area. 
